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Knowing two months in advance that a major attack was coming and still failing to stop it is a massive security breakdown that demands accountability. At least 50 incidents tore through Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, and the Fourth Army still couldn't intercept a single suspect at checkpoints. Bringing in troops from outside the region created gaps that insurgents exploited — and that falls squarely on military leadership. It's time the government reviewed its strategy toward the southern insurgency.
Guarding hundreds of thousands of electricity pylons and countless dispersed sites across three provinces at night with limited personnel is simply not feasible, so framing this as an intelligence failure misreads the situation entirely. These attacks were designed for psychological effect, not mass casualties, and the army's intelligence community was already tracking the broader threat. Demanding accountability based on incomplete, unverified accounts plays directly into the attackers' strategy.