Gain-of-Function Research and the COVID Origins Debate

Gain-of-Function Research and the COVID Origins Debate
Above: Health workers conduct COVID-19 tests at the St. Vincents Hospital drive-through testing clinic at Bondi Beach in Sydney, Australia on June 27, 2021. Image copyright: Steven Saphore/Contributor/AFP via Getty Images

Early GOF Funding and Oversight

Before 2014, U.S. funding mechanisms for viral research — including GOF studies — operated with relatively limited oversight.

Federal agencies such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH), National Science Foundation (NSF), and Department of Defense (DOD) were major funders of international virology projects. The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 allowed researchers to patent government-funded inventions, potentially influencing research agendas and commercial incentives.

Early International Collaboration and U.S.-China Ties

International collaboration between U.S. and Chinese labs grew significantly after the 2003 SARS outbreak. Dr. Hugh Auchincloss, who would later serve as Dr. Fauci's temporary successor at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), led efforts to expand collaborative research with Chinese institutions. In 2011, Auchincloss traveled to Beijing to sign an agreement with a Chinese military-linked science foundation that funded work on bat coronaviruses conducted by New York-based EcoHealth Alliance and the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV).

The WIV also collaborated with labs in Texas, France, and Canada, and received funding from EcoHealth, which itself received funding from the NIAID. Some observers have noted that these collaborations included research related to GOF techniques, and that Dr. Shi Zhengli — who conducted coronavirus research at WIV — received training at the University of North Carolina, where Dr. Ralph Baric led similar studies.

Above: A resident at a COVID testing booth in Shanghai, China, on Wednesday, Dec. 7, 2022, Image copyright:Qilai Shen/Bloomberg/Getty Images

Scientific Advocacy vs. Security Concerns

In 2012, Dr. Anthony Fauci publicly defended GOF research, stating that the potential benefits in vaccine development and viral understanding often outweighed the risks. However, critics argued that using U.S. taxpayer funds to support such research — particularly in foreign high-containment labs — violated regulatory safeguards and posed national security risks.

Emerging Biosecurity Concerns

Despite the scientific advances, safety concerns began to intensify. Initial safety protocols were stringent, with experiments conducted in high-containment laboratories, but critics argued even strict oversight might not mitigate all risks.

The controversy peaked in 2012 when controversial studies on H5N1 avian flu conducted in high-security labs sparked heated debates about biosecurity risks. These studies involved manipulating wild viruses to study their potential to infect humans.

Above: Sign on empty shelf at supermarket due to avian flu in Queens, New York on Jan. 20, 2025, Image copyright:Lindsey Nicholson/UCG/Universal Images Group/Getty Images

Regulatory and Diplomatic Red Flags

Fears of accidental release of enhanced pathogens became a central issue following the avian flu outbreak. The Government Accountability Office raised alarms, leading to congressional hearings on improving lab safety oversight. U.S. embassy officials in Beijing later warned about potential safety risks at WIV in 2017 and 2018.

Dual-Use Dilemma and Strategic Priorities

The dual-use nature of GOF research — offering both life-saving insights and potential biowarfare applications — posed a dilemma for regulators. The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) was assigned to weigh benefits and risks. Despite increasing recognition of pandemic threats as national security issues, the U.S. was criticized for underinvesting in domestic virology capacity before 2014.